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The Environmental Protection 
Agency Turns Fifty 
Jonathan H. Adler† 
On July 9, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed Congress of his 
plan to create a federal environmental-protection agency.1 In response 
to growing environmental concerns and perceptions of an “environ–
mental crisis,”2 Nixon called for a new executive-branch agency tasked 
with protecting the nation’s people and resources from pollution and 
environmental harm. Although many environmental programs and 
offices existed throughout the federal government, Nixon explained that 
“only by reorganizing our Federal efforts” would it be possible to 
“effectively ensure the protection, development and enhancement of the 
total environment itself.”3 In his reorganization plan, Nixon called for 
the establishment of a single agency, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), that would be empowered to “make a coordinated 
attack on the pollutants which debate the air we breathe, the water we 
drink, and the land that grows our food.”4 
Creating this new agency required reassembling offices, bureaus and 
responsibilities spread throughout the federal government, including 
divisions within the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, and 
 
†  Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and 
the Director of the Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law at 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 
1970), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. at 202–07 (2006). The 
Reorganization plan, which became effective on September 9, 1970, also 
provided for the creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration within the Department of Commerce. 
2. See James Morton Turner & Andrew C. Isenberg, The 
Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from 
Nixon to Trump 12 (2018) (characterizing the period in which the EPA 
was created as “a moment of environmental crisis”). While this was the 
widespread perception at the time, many environmental problems had 
begun to recede by the 1970s. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 93 (2004) 
(discussing misperceptions of pre-1970 environmental trends); see also 
Jonathan H. Adler, Environmental Federalism in America: Let 
Fifty Flowers Bloom, ch. 2 (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with 
author). 
3. See President Richard Nixon, Special Message from the President to the 
Congress About Reorganization Plans to Establish the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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what was then known as the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare.5 Other offices were transferred from smaller agencies, such as 
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Radiation Council, and 
the newly created Council on Environmental Quality.6 Although Nixon 
was on record opposing the creation of new federal agencies, the need 
for a more coordinated and effective federal response to environmental 
concerns justified a one-time exception.7 
From its inception, the EPA’s role and orientation was the subject 
of conflict and debate.8 Although President Nixon rejected proposals to 
create a federal environmental agency that would be simultaneously 
responsible for environmental protection and resource development,9 he 
nonetheless expected the Agency to integrate and balance 
environmental protections with economic concerns.10 Some members of 
Congress had other ideas, as did leaders in the rapidly expanding 
environmental movement.11 In their view, the EPA should be an 
unrelenting champion of environmental protection and a counterweight 
 
5. See Russell E. Train, The Environmental Record of the Nixon 
Administration, 26 Presidential Stud. Q. 185, 188 (1996). 
6. The Council on Environmental Quality was established by the National 
Environmental Policy Act in 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 854–
56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2012)). 
7. See President Richard Nixon, supra note 3 (“In proposing that the 
Environmental Protection Agency be set up as a separate new agency, I 
am making an exception to one of my own principles: that, as a matter of 
effective and orderly administration, additional new independent agencies 
normally should not be created. In this case, however, the arguments 
against placing environmental protection activities under the jurisdiction 
of one or another of the existing departments and agencies are 
compelling.”). Interestingly enough, the proposal for a new environmental 
agency arose from a commission process initially designed to streamline 
federal bureaucracy. See Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The 
Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies 227–
28 (2nd ed. 1996) (discussing the debates within the Ash Council over the 
creation of a new environmental agency). 
8. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 88–
89 (2004) (discussing the conflicts over the EPA’s role). 
9. See Marc K. Landy et al., The Environmental Protection 
Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions—From Nixon to Clinton 
29–32 (expanded ed. 1994) (discussing the Nixon Administration’s 
consideration and rejection of a proposal to create the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources). 
10. See id. at 33 (“The President and his aides expected the leader of the 
EPA to be a balancer and integrator, to pursue environmental protection 
in ways that were compatible with industrial expansion and resource 
development.”). 
11. Id. 
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to those agencies institutionally prone to support resource development 
and economic growth.12 
The EPA officially opened its doors on December 2, 1970.13 Its first 
Administrator, William Ruckleshaus, took quickly to the role. He 
vigorously pursued the enforcement of federal environmental laws, 
including the newly enacted Clean Air Act.14 Indeed, during the first 
sixty days of the EPA’s existence, it “brought five times as many 
enforcement actions as the agencies it inherited had brought during any 
similar period.”15 The new agency quickly made its presence felt. 
Though Ruckleshaus may have hit the ground running, not all of 
his successors would pursue enforcement with the same vigor, nor would 
every subsequent administration support expansive conceptions of the 
federal government’s role in addressing environmental pollution. 
President Ford “effectively disowned the EPA” during his brief tenure 
in office.16 The Reagan Administration, in particular, sought to curtail 
the Agency’s footprint on the American economy.17 Others with more 
environmentally friendly reputations have also sought to balance 
economic and environmental concerns. Even the Obama Admin–
istration risked an environmental backlash by overruling an EPA 
decision to tighten air-quality standards, reportedly due to concerns 
about the political fallout.18 
Virtually all human activity has an environmental effect, so 
environmental concerns are omnipresent in modern society. 
 
12. Id. The EPA itself was also initially staffed with many people who saw 
themselves as “shock troops committed to stringent environmental 
regulation.” Harris & Milkis, supra note 7, at 231 (quoting former EPA 
official Joseph Krevac). 
13. See Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, EPA J., Nov. 1985, at 6, available at 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/birth-epa.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 5E94-F33V]. 
14. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 
(1970). Although the 1970 enactment amended the pre-existing Clean Air 
Act, the 1970 law is generally referred to as the Clean Air Act because it 
erected the existing regulatory architecture for air-pollution control. 
15. See Landy, et al., supra note 9, at 36. 
16. Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 46. 
17. See Landy et al., supra note 9, at 245–46 (discussing the Reagan 
Administration’s desire to reduce environmental regulation); Turner & 
Isenberg, supra note 2, at 51–52 (discussing Regan’s “blithe 
nonchalance” about environmental concerns). 
18. See Deborah Solomon & Tenille Tracy, Obama Asks EPA to Pull Ozone 
Rule, Wall St. J. (Sept. 3, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100 
 01424053111904716604576546422160891728 [https://perma.cc/6J6V-
WHW7]; see also Alex Guillen, Obama’s New Ozone Standard Has Greens 
Seeing Red, Politico (Oct. 1, 2015, 4:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/ 
 story/2015/10/obama-administration-tightens-regulations-for-smog-causing-
ozone-pollution-214323 [https://perma.cc/228A-QP4Y]. 
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Consequently, environmental regulations have the potential to reach all 
manner of economically productive activity, and such regulatory 
impositions are not always received warmly by those subject to 
regulation.19 President George H. W. Bush may have campaigned to be 
the “environmental president” in 1988,20 but in 1992 he criticized 
environmental extremism as part of his reelection effort.21 As a 
candidate, Donald Trump went even farther, calling EPA regulation a 
“disgrace”22 and threatening to bring environmental protection “back 
to the states”23—although as President he has touted the nation’s 
environmental leadership and proclaimed his support for “the cleanest 
air” and “crystal-clean water.”24 
In anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary of the EPA’s founding, 
the Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law and the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review sponsored a symposium to look at the 
past, present, and future of the EPA.25 The conference featured an array 
of environmental-law and -policy experts, including individuals who 
served in environmental-policy positions in each of the last four 
presidential administrations, as well as the current EPA Administrator, 
 
19. In 1979, the Business Roundtable identified environmental regulation as 
more expensive than other forms of “social” regulation that were initiated 
in the 1960s and 1970s. See Harris & Milkis, supra note 7, at 225 (“Of 
all the new social regulation, that dealing with environmental quality 
imposed the highest compliance costs on business firms.”). 
20. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 105 (noting that Bush’s position distanced 
him from the Reagan Administration’s environmental record, and drew a 
critical contrast with the environmental record of his Democratic 
opponent, Michael Dukakis); Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 116 
(same). 
21. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 127; Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, 
at 86. 
22. See Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting from an interview 
with Donald Trump in which he said of the EPA: “what they do is a 
disgrace”). 
23. Ben Adler, Trump’s Budget Plan Is Completely Insane—and of Course It 
Would Screw Over the Environment, Grist (Feb. 27, 2016), https://grist 
 .org/politics/trumps-budget-plan-is-completely-insane-and-of-course-it-would-
screw-over-the-environment/ [https://perma.cc/87QS-56B5] (quoting 
Trump’s response to a budget question during a CNN/Telemundo debate). 
24. President Donald Trump, Remarks on America’s Environmental 
Leadership (July 8, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
 briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-americas-environmental-
leadership/ [https://perma.cc/F39V-KPR7]. 
25. Video of the symposium is available at: Law Review Symposium & Coleman 
Burke Center for Environmental Law Conference: The Environmental 
Protection Agency Turns 50, Case W. Res. U. Sch. L. (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://case.edu/law/our-school/events-lectures/environmental-protection-
agency-turns-50 [https://perma.cc/HLG6-AJZ2]. 
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Andrew Wheeler. The articles from this conference are published in this 
special symposium issue of the law review. 
After fifty years, the EPA is still concerned with maintaining and 
improving air and water quality, controlling and cleaning up hazardous 
wastes, and limiting the environmental toll of modern industry. Yet 
much has changed. The focus on larger, more conspicuous sources of 
environmental harms has given way to more dispersed, more diffuse, 
and often harder-to-identify environmental concerns.26 Nonpoint-source 
water pollution and climate change have also brought environmental 
concerns, and their causes, closer to home for many Americans. Any 
illusion that environmental protection can be pursued merely by 
regulating some distant industrial source has been dispelled.27 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is among the “most far-reaching,” and 
most successful, regulatory enactments.28 The phase-out of lead from 
gasoline, in particular, stands out as a highlight of the Agency’s 
potential to advance public health through pollution control.29 The 
CAA also provided the EPA with the legal authority to impose limits 
on vehicular emissions and to phase-out chloroflourocarbons and other 
chemicals that deplete the stratospheric ozone. 
The “heart” of the CAA comprises the provisions providing for the 
creation and enforcement of National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
that each metropolitan area in the nation is required to meet.30 
 
26. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 227 (“[T]he brunt of much existing 
environmental law has been borne by large industrial facilities; relatively 
less attention has been focused on small, more localized sources [of 
environmental harms] . . . .”). 
27. See Turner & Isenberg, supra note 2, at 13 (noting the “unanticipated 
scope” of federal environmental regulation); see also Lazarus, supra note 
8, at 88 (noting the tension between broad support for environmental 
regulations and a general unwillingness to bear the necessary regulatory 
burdens). 
28. See Janet Currie & Reed Walker, What Do Economists Have to Say about 
the Clean Air Act 50 Years after the Establishment of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 4 (2019). 
29. See Robert V. Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, 
Science and Policy (4th ed. 2003) (noting that lead phase-out is 
“widely viewed as one of the greatest environmental success stories, even 
by those otherwise critical of environmental regulation”); see also Richard 
G. Newell & Kristin Rogers, Resources for the Future, The U.S. 
Experience with the Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline (Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper, 2003), http://web.mit.edu/ckolstad/www/Newell.pdf. 
30. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (characterizing 
provisions requiring state implementation plans to meet NAAQS 
standards as “[t]he heart of the [CAA]”); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The 
Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 121, 
121 (2001) (“The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
form the centerpiece of what many consider to be this country’s single 
most important environmental program.”). 
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Although urban concentrations of some air pollutants had begun to 
decline prior to 1970,31 the CAA is widely credited with continuing to 
drive down ambient air-pollution levels over the past few decades,32 
even as industrial activity and fuel consumption continued to increase.33 
Retrospective analyses conclude that some CAA regulations are likely 
the EPA’s most cost-beneficial regulatory interventions.34 
More recently, and controversially, the CAA has been identified as 
a source of authority for the regulation of greenhouse gases.35 This 
presents a challenge for the Agency, as the CAA was not written with 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in mind. The Act’s core 
provisions focus on locally concentrated pollutants and a cooperative 
federalism model through which state and local governments develop 
plans to ensure that local areas meet national air-quality goals. 
Whatever the merits of this approach, it does not scale cleanly to the 
control of a ubiquitous and globally dispersed pollutant such as carbon 
dioxide. Yet because Congress has not seen fit to revise the underlying 
statutes, these are the tools the EPA has to address the issue.36 
A more rational approach to addressing greenhouse gases might 
task the EPA with developing a nationwide cap-and-trade system or, 
as Donald Elliott suggests, taxes or user fees.37 Normally, one might 
assume congressional approval would be required for such a move, but 
Elliott suggests that the EPA may already have the necessary statutory 
authority to impose fees on carbon emissions. The EPA has arguably 
 
31. See Robert W. Crandall, Controlling Industrial Pollution: 
The Economics and Politics of Clean Air 19 (1983); see also Indur 
Goklany, Clearing the Air 137 (1999); Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution 
Policy, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 27, 50–
51 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990). 
32. See Currie & Walker, supra note 28, at 4 (documenting the decline in air 
pollution between 1980 and 2015); see also Andrew Wheeler, The EPA at 
Fifty Symposium: Keynote Address, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 883 (2020). 
33. See Currie & Walker, supra note 28, at 3 (“This decline in pollution has 
occurred even while primary sources of air pollution such as electricity 
generation, transportation, and industrial activity have continued to 
expand.”). 
34. See Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the 
Clean Air Act from 1990–2020 (2011), available at https://www.epa 
.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf. 
35. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
36. For a discussion of the EPA’s initiatives and some of the difficulties 
applying the Clean Air Act to greenhouse gases, see Jonathan H. Adler, 
Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas 
Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 421 (2011). 
37. E. Donald Elliott, A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at 
Fifty and a Suggestion for how It Might Do Even Better, 70 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 895 (2020). 
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been less aggressive than some other federal agencies at seeking to 
expand its mandate. Indeed, it had to be dragged by the Supreme Court 
into regulating greenhouse gases at all.38 The question for Elliott’s 
proposal is whether the EPA is rightly wary of judicial review, or 
whether it has been too cautious in its willingness to use broad and 
powerful tools to address a looming environmental concern. 
At the present moment, there is little prospect of an aggressive or 
innovative effort to re-program the CAA for greenhouse-gas-emissions 
control. As Administrator Wheeler has made clear, he sees the EPA as 
a direct agent of Congress, authorized and instructed to go as far as the 
legislature has instructed, and not an inch farther.39 Consequently, the 
Agency is pushing states to meet long-standing environmental 
obligations, while simultaneously scaling back the more aggressive 
regulatory initiatives launched under the Obama Administration. As 
Joseph Goffman and Laura Bloomer explain, the EPA is abandoning 
the more “progressive” posture and adopting legal interpretations of the 
CAA and other statutes that would preclude more aggressive 
regulation.40 Insofar as these new interpretations are accepted in the 
courts, it could be more difficult for the EPA to reverse course in the 
future, barring congressional intervention.41 
Judicial review will be decisive in determining whether the Trump 
Administration’s efforts to reorient the EPA are successful. This should 
not surprise anyone, for the courts have played an intimate role in the 
development of federal environmental regulation.42 Even if the EPA’s 
regulations are challenged less often than some would suppose, as Cary 
Coglianese and Daniel Walters report, the most substantial and 
consequential rules inevitably end up in court, where the Agency, 
 
38. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
39. Wheeler, supra note 32, at 887 (quoting former EPA Administrator 
William Ruckelshaus, who said that the EPA’s mission “is to be as forceful 
as the laws that Congress has provided.”). In response to questions at the 
conference, Administrator Wheeler further said that the EPA is acting on 
climate only to the extent authorized and directed to by Congress. 
40. Joseph Goffman & Laura Bloomer, Disempowering the EPA: How Statutory 
Interpretation of the Clean Air Act Serves the Trump Administration’s 
Deregulatory Agenda, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 929 (2020).  
41. Of course, at the time of this writing, it is an open question whether the 
EPA’s initiatives will survive in court. Trump’s EPA’s early record 
surviving judicial review is mixed at best. See Jonathan H. Adler, Hostile 
Environment, Nat’l Rev. (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www 
 .nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/10/15/hostile-environment/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/L5RK-HUVY]; Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, A Half 
Century of EPA Rulemaking in Court, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1007 
(2020) (noting the EPA’s “particularly poor record” over the past several 
years). 
42. Coglianese & Walters, supra note 41, at 1017 (“The courts have . . . 
proven a fixture in the history of the EPA’s first fifty years.”). 
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throughout most of its history, has tended to prevail.43 Industry groups 
routinely challenge agency rules tightening controls or imposing new 
standards, even when the legal claims against the rules do not seem 
particularly strong.44 At the same time, environmentalist groups stand 
at the ready to push the EPA to be still more aggressive, or to defend 
against efforts to weaken regulatory requirements. 
The current moment may be particularly instructive because 
judicial review seems to have played a particularly important role when 
the EPA’s leadership—or the White House to which it reports—has 
pursued particularly dramatic changes in environmental law. It is worth 
recalling that Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council45 resulted from the Reagan Administration’s Clean Air Act 
regulatory-reform efforts, and that Utility Air Regulatory Group v. 
EPA46 was prompted by the Obama Administration’s effort to retrofit 
greenhouse-gas-emission controls into the Clean Air Act’s stationary-
source provisions. 
Environmental-policy narratives often present simple morality tales 
in which noble activists seek to enlist the government to combat money-
grubbing industrialists. To be sure, some environmental disputes fit 
that script, but plenty of others do not. The particular details of given 
regulatory measures often involve environmental trade-offs or pit one 
economic interest against another. A fight over gasoline regulation may 
pit environmentalists against industry, or it may pit ethanol producers 
against oil companies, or perhaps both conflicts occur at the same 
time.47 Brian Mannix surveys some of the examples.48 
There is ample academic work documenting how economic interests 
have molded, and in some cases hijacked, environmental regulation to 
serve their own ends, sometimes at the expense of the very 
environmental values the laws purport to serve.49 What is the EPA’s 
 
43. Id. 
44. In some cases, the purpose of challenging rules is not necessarily to have 
the rules overturned as much as it is to delay their implementation, which 
can itself reduce the economic costs of compliance for regulated firms. 
45. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
46. 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
47. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Environmental 
Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 19 (Michael S. Greve & 
Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (discussing the special-interest battles 
behind the oxygenated-fuel and reformulated-gas provisions of the 1990 
Clean Air Act). 
48. Brian F. Mannix, The EPA at Fifty: Time to Give Bootleggers the Boot!, 
70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1081 (2020). 
49. For various examples of this phenomenon, see Stuart Buck & Bruce 
Yandle, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 177 (2002); Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty 
Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in Political 
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role in such disputes? One would hope the Agency resists efforts to 
commandeer its regulations for economic gain, and sometimes it does. 
Yet, as Mannix notes, in some cases the EPA appears to be a willing 
participant in the special-interest manipulation of environmental 
regulation, even if only to enlist additional political muscle in support 
of its other goals.50 
Those seeking to influence environmental regulatory decisions 
inevitably seek to buttress their policy positions with appeals to agency 
expertise. For decades, the EPA and other agencies have conducted 
cost–benefit analyses when developing and proposing major reg–
ulations.51 At their best, such analyses help maximize the net benefits 
new regulatory initiatives provide, furthering greater transparency and 
accountability about the EPA’s major policy choices. At times, 
however, interest groups seek to manipulate these analyses to ensure a 
desired outcome. 
As Wendy Wagner observes, EPA expertise has been under 
political and special-interest pressure from the outset.52 Despite such 
pressures, the EPA has often been able to maintain its independent 
expertise, sometimes with judicial support53—but not always. Under the 
Trump Administration, as Michael Livermore explains, the EPA has 
departed from many of its traditional methodological practices with 
regard to cost–benefit analyses in ways that will make it more difficult 
to justify new regulatory measures, particularly those that generate 
substantial co-benefits.54 
Environmental concerns extend beyond national boundaries, as has 
the EPA’s influence. From its inception, the EPA has undertaken to 
address international environmental concerns and, as Robert Percival 
documents, has influenced the development of environmental law over–
 
Environmentalism 1 (Terry Anderson ed., 2000); Todd J. Zywicki, 
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political 
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 845 
(1999); Environmental Politics, supra note 47. 
50. Mannix, supra note 48. 
51. There are some notable exceptions, such as where the relevant statutes 
preclude the consideration of costs or a cost–benefit analysis. See, e.g., 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the 
EPA may not consider costs when setting the national ambient-air-quality 
standards). 
52. Wendy Wagner, It Isn’t Easy Being a Bureaucratic Expert: Celebrating 
the EPA’s Innovations, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1093 (2020).  
53. See, e.g., Physicians for Soc. Responsibility v. Wheeler, 956 F.3d 634 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (rejecting the EPA’s attempt to alter eligibility 
requirements for science-advisory panels). 
54. Michael A. Livermore, Polluting the EPA’s Long Tradition of Economic 
Analysis, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1063 (2020). 
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seas.55 Indeed, as Percival explains, the EPA has often “served as a role 
model for countries seeking to upgrade their environmental laws and 
policies.”56 While numerous environmental problems remain, the United 
States remains a leader in air and water quality,57 and the EPA’s 
technical and scientific expertise continues to command respect around 
the world.58 
The EPA’s international significance is only likely to grow in the 
years ahead. Global climate change, in particular, will command the 
attention of environmental agencies around the globe. Not all of the 
action will occur in the public sector, however. As Michael 
Vandenbergh, Jonathan Gilligan and Haley Feuerman explore, private 
firms and institutions are playing an essential role in the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the deployment of low-carbon production 
methods.59 These trends, they suggest, are facilitated in part by the 
“revolving door” between environmental agencies, advocacy organi–
zations, and major corporations.60 
Insofar as the revolving door that Vandenbergh and his co-authors 
describe is influencing organizational behavior in corporations and other 
institutions, it demonstrates how individuals working within existing 
institutions can affect environmental change. Yet the history of 
environmental law is hardly the sole domain of such institutional 
insiders. Those on the outside, protesting the inadequacy of existing 
laws, norms, or practices have always played an important role as well. 
As Emily Hammond documents, protest plays an important role in the 
development of environmental policy in both the legal and political 
realms.61 This is not a new phenomenon, however. It has been a part of 
the environmental-policy landscape for over fifty years. Indeed, it is 
worth wondering whether, without protest, such as the massive 
gatherings that occasioned the first Earth Day in April 1970, we would 
today be commemorating the EPA’s fiftieth anniversary. 
Fifty years after that first Earth Day and the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, it is worth reflecting on what the 
EPA has accomplished, and what has yet to be done. The Agency has 
had its share of successes, as well as failures, and it has been at the 
center of some of the most contentious and consequential policy debates 
 
55. Robert V. Percival, The EPA as a Catalyst for the Development of Global 
Environmental Law, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1151 (2020). 
56. Id. at 1151. 
57. See Wheeler, supra note 32, at 887. 
58. See Percival, supra note 55, at 1158. 
59. Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., The New Revolving Door, 70 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1121 (2020). 
60. Id. 
61. Emily Hammond, Toward a Role for Protest in Environmental Law, 70 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1039 (2020). 
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of the past half century. Learning from the EPA’s first fifty years can 
help light the path for the next fifty, and help chart the future course 
of environmental protection. 
